Caught between vast, self-regarding waves of boomers and millennials, Generation X is steeped in irony, detachment, and a sense of dread. One of their rank argues that this attitude makes it the best suited to preserve American tradition in these dark new days.
gawd i love the Rude Pundit :
Sequester and the GOP Brand of Crisis, Part 1:
The Rude Pundit hasn’t written much about the sequester-mageddon torching the nation on Friday because there’s a part of his whiskey-addled brain that doesn’t believe it will happen; there’s another part that thinks it won’t be nearly as bad as the Chicken Littles on all sides, defense and non-defense, believe it will be; and there’s yet a third part that thinks, “Are you fucking serious? Are we really fucking doing this catastrophe dance again? Oh, fuck me with a rake.”
Allow for a moment of dime store psychological and historical synthesis here: Republicans crave crisis – it is their water, their air, their food. It used to be that we were in a state of perpetual crisis in our endless (mostly) Cold War with the Soviet Union. Look at who led us during the later years of it: Nixon, Ford, Reagan, with a brief detour with Jimmy Carter, who was attacked for, among other reasons, not honoring the crisis mentality enough (hence his idiotic, politically-driven boycotting of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow because the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, for fuck’s sake).
When the Soviet Union crumbled, the driving force behind American foreign policy, and, to a large degree, the Republican brand crumbled, too. Republicans needed crisis, goddamnit, threats domestic and foreign because without crises that required immediate action, people would realize, “Oh, hey, howzabout we spend some money on education or roads or some shit we need?” And that would be the end of the GOP. So we got Grenada. Central America. The Persian Gulf War. (You could throw crime in cities and welfare recipients onto the the threat pile.)
But it wasn’t enough. When Bill Clinton got elected, he was able to shift, at least a bit, the conscience of the country away from the GOP’s “Holy shit, we gotta do everything to protect you from communists” to “Why not see what we can do to make life a little better?” That doesn’t mean Clinton got it right (he certainly fucked up on a lot of things, like health care, welfare, and GLBT issues), but it was a change in the way that citizens and the government interacted. It wasn’t about constantly bugging out at world-ending nuclear nightmares, but, in a very general sense, it was a move to governing in the sense of running the country at a smooth pace, not acting like the whole thing was on the verge of collapse. So, of course, of course, Republicans had to create crisis after crisis, -gate after -gate, to bring down the President, yes, but also to keep the anxiety level of a large part of the population high.
Does it even need to be said that the Bush years, post-9/11, were one prolonged crisis? That terrorism was manna from heaven for Republicans? That war was the coolest thing the GOP could ask for?
Now, under Obama, with terrorism pretty much under control (even though, yes, yes, we have to remain ever-vigilant against threats, as we always fucking have, as every fucking nation has to), the GOP has needed to have another crisis in order to extend its brand of politics, so we have the debt, and with it the debt ceiling, budget cuts, intransigence against tax hikes, and more.
The point is this: since the Cold War, and for a large part of that even, and except for 9/11, nearly every crisis this country has faced in the last generation, has been manufactured by the Republican Party as a means of promoting its brand of conservatism, whatever that conservatism has been at the time – anti-Communist, family values, fiscal, whatever. And the current sequester and upcoming debt ceiling fight are part and parcel of that. No, Democrats are not immune to such manipulations (Gulf of Tonkin, anyone?), but since Nixon, that has been the way Republicans govern. If Democrats could make infrastructure repair into a threat to the lives of Americans (which they easily could), you would see the nation demanding something be done to fix roads and bridges. The GOP knows how to hold a knife to the throat of the country.
Which is what they are doing now, again, again, again.
The worst punditry going on right now ascribes blame to both parties. That is a lie. That is believing in the GOP’s version of crisis. If someone sets a fire, are you going to complain if the firefighters are yelling too loudly while they try to put it out?
The country needs to chill the fuck out. Republicans won’t allow that.
I try to follow politics and keep up on the latest news and after the tragedies first here in Aurora CO, then the mall in OR & finally the massacre in Newton CT, national discourse has turned to gun-control and the 2nd Amendment.
Now if I were King, I would get rid of all privately-owned guns ( just my opinion and yes I have tried to shoot a gun before and couldn’t. My husband took me to a shooting-range and I freaked out at the sound of the guns after just walking in ). I have had discussions with pro-gun people on Facebook and it always boils down to one talking-point : the 2nd Amendment and the “well regulated militia”. Now I always say that the 2nd & 3rd words of that statement are of particular importance and I have not seen anything that tells me anything to do with guns is well-regulated. But the pro-gun side always says it’s their right to have a citizens militia as provided in the Amendment.
I don’t think these people understand what a “militia” really is so I’m posting this :
The Constitutional Militia Clause, the Militia Act of 1792
and the Rise of a Nation
Brig. Gen. Kennard R. Wiggins, Jr. (DE ANG Ret.)
Among the first issues that must be addressed by any nation is how to defend itself and maintain
public safety and national security. At the onset of the American experiment in representative
democracy the answer seemed obvious. America would rely primarily upon its militia of citizen
soldiers. It resembled a uniform system of conscription for all free able-bodied males aged 18-45 in
time of need. This solution, as we shall see, was flawed and fraught with problems large and small.
This notion, of a militia based defense was founded in a Jeffersonian agrarian society symbolized by
Daniel Chester French’s Minuteman statue of the citizen laying aside his plow to take up his musket.
It was deeply rooted. After all, hadn’t the militia cast off the yoke of the monarchy in 1775? It
remains an ideal of a sort, that we continue to pursue today, but in a highly modified form. Our
citizen soldier of today is the result of over two hundred years of evolutionary change to a model
our forefathers would now barely recognize.
The United State Constitution formalized the long standing colonial practice of maintaining a
Militia. Delaware dates its militia from the early Swedish settlers of 1655 attempting to defend
themselves from the Dutch. A “Militia Clause” was included in the constitution as a hedge against
standing armies that were viewed with suspicion in light of the recent War of Independence. The
standing army was referred to as “the Engine of arbitrary power, which has so often and
successfully been used for the subversion of freedom” according to Luther Martin. Elbridge Gerry
added, “If a regular army is admitted, will not the militia be neglected and gradually dwindle into
contempt? The Constitution gives Congress the ability to “raise and support armies”, but attempts
to circumscribe the regular force with appropriations of monies for a term of no more than two
years. The document also tasks the congress “to provide and maintain a navy”. It then goes on to
specifically delineate a Militia in Article 1, Section 8, it calls for the Congress to:
“Provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions.
Also to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such Part of them as may
be employed in the Service of the United States reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers,
and the Authority for training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”
The second amendment states that “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Modern interpretation defines this as
an individual right, but in the context of the times, it is clear there was a relationship between
bearing arms and “a well-regulated Militia” that is sometimes overlooked today, but was critical at
our nation’s founding. It was added at the insistence of the anti-federalists to prevent the federal
government from disarming the militia. Three years later, the Militia Act of 1792 would further
expound upon this perceived need, and offer specifics.
This constitutional language remains the guiding charter for today’s National Guard, the modern
version of the Militia. There is still a dual responsibility to both State and Nation for the modern day
militiamen of the National Guard. This federal/state relationship was codified almost at the onset of
our nation, and it has been refined ever since.
The Militia Act of 1792
The Post-Revolutionary War Delaware Militia served under the Governor of Delaware, who was its
commander in chief, according to the State Constitution adopted in 1792. This organization could
be called into federal service by the President in the event of war. An Adjutant General would be
appointed by the governor to oversee the training, discipline and administration of the organization,
as well as enact the orders of the governor.
Perpetuating colonial practice, the Militia of the national period was defined in the federal Militia Act
of May 8, 1792 was comprised of all free able-bodied males aged 18-45. All fifteen states enacted new
militia laws, each of which reaffirmed the state government’s power to conscript. This cohort was
labeled the “Enrolled Militia” and the members were expected to provide their own arms and
equipment. This scheme amounted to universal military service for almost all men. The reality was
that this design was difficult to put into practice without monies for pay, equipment or training.
Further, there were no sanctions for non-compliance. Its success was predicated mostly on the
political will and the pocketbook of the individual states.
The Militia Act specified an organizational scheme that specified, “each brigade shall consist of four
regiments; each regiment of two battalions; each battalion of five companies; each company of sixty-
four privates.” Each unit would have a number assigned by the State. In reality there was variation
from state to state, and from unit to unit that would be dictated by geography and local
The Act also described in some detail, some of the auxiliary functions and specialties required in
addition to the line infantry of the organization. It specified:
“That out of the militia enrolled as is herein directed, there shall be formed for each battalion, as least one company
of grenadiers, light infantry or riflemen; and that each division there shall be, at least, one company of artillery,
and one troop of horse: There shall be to each company of artillery, one captain, two lieutenants, four serjeants,
four corporals, six gunners, six bombardiers, one drummer, and one fifer. The officers to be armed with a sword
or hanger, a fusee, bayonet and belt, with a cartridge box to contain twelve cartridges; and each private of matoss
shall furnish themselves with good horses of at least fourteen hands and an half high, and to be armed with a
sword and pair of pistols, the holsters of which to be covered with bearskin caps. Each dragoon to furnish himself
with a serviceable horse, at least fourteen hands and an half high, a good saddle, bridle, mail-pillion and valise,
holster, and a best plate and crupper, a pair of boots and spurs; a pair of pistols, a sabre, and a cartouchbox to
contain twelve cartridges for pistols. That each company of artillery and troop of house shall be formed of
volunteers from the brigade, at the discretion of the Commander in Chief of the State, not exceeding one company of
each to a regiment, nor more in number than one eleventh part of the infantry, and shall be uniformly clothed in
raiments, to be furnished at their expense, the colour and fashion to be determined by the Brigadier commanding the
brigade to which they belong.”
The Adjutant General’s report to the Governor for 1810 listed three numbered Delaware brigades
consisting of ten numbered regiments as well as assorted specialties such as companies of artillery,
and troops of horse. The Delaware population at that time supported 8356 officers and men in her
Militia of three brigades.
Manning and Rank Structure
The Militia Act of 1792 also specified a rank structure to accompany the organization. It specified:
“To each division one Major-General, with two Aids-de-camp, with the rank of major; to each
brigade, one brigadier-major, with the rank of a major; to each company, one captain, one
lieutenant, one ensign, four sergeants, four corporals, one drummer, and one fifer and bugler. That
there shall be a regimental staff, to consist of one adjutant, and one quartermaster, to rank as
lieutenants; one paymaster; one surgeon, and one surgeon’s mate; one serjeant-major; one drum-
major, and one fife-major.”
The senior leadership of the Militia was appointed by the governor including most senior and field
grade officers. This made the process subject to political pressures. General officers were not paid, but
it was a very prestigious position for those with political ambition. Many a governor or elected
official boasted a Militia commission in his resume.
The prevailing Jeffersonian philosophy of this time was “the supremacy of the civil over the military
authority” and faith that the militia would “be our best reliance in peace and for the first months of
war until the Regulars may relieve them”. Mistrust of the standing army remained, as Jefferson cut
its ranks while promoting his militia policies. The nation would rely almost solely upon the militia
for its primary defense in time of war.
The “Calling Forth Act”
A second Congressional measure that passed at the same time, the “Calling Forth Act”, specified the
general conditions under which state militias could be called into national service. The Act instituted
heavy fines for failure to report when drafted for national service. Just as when responding to state
calls, each militia district had a quota to be filled first by volunteers and then by draftees. Because the
Act still left the actual drafting to the states, fines became the dual responsibility of both levels of
government. The problem of maintaining participation in the militia was even more difficult in
peacetime. Without an external threat, there was little sense of urgency.
This was a frustrating process in practice. Many pages of militia records from the Delaware Military
archives are devoted to the detailed accounting of who was present or absent for musters of
militiamen, court martial proceedings and fines. The Adjutant General, John Stockton wrote to
Governor Bassett in 1799:
Wilmington, December 30th, 1799
Herewith I transmit the returns of Several Brigades, making one division of Militia in the State of Delaware; tho’
not compleat, as much so, as in my power; owing to my not receiving the returns of company in the Second Brigade
& one Troop of Horse in the first Brigade, and some inaccuracies in other returns, which I could not get in time…
From the trouble and expences attendant on this business, in collecting and arranging the returns, Summoning &
attending on General Court Martials; I am disposed to think some compensation should be allowed by the
Legislature, as is done in other States; but if, upon consideration, the Legislature be of opinion no allowance ought
to be made for such services, I shall request you to accept of my resignation.”
JNO STOCKTON, Adjt. Genl.
With no immediate foreign threat, and little danger from Native Americans in Delaware, the Militia
became a phantom army that appeared to be formidable on paper, with thousands of soldiers and
arms, but in fact suffered from neglected training, deteriorated weapons, and lackadaisical leadership.
Some were excused entirely from Militia service including elected officials, the clergy, pilots and
mariners, customs and postal officers, critical workers such as ferrymen, gunsmiths and ironworkers
as well as the politically well-connected. Others could pay substitutes to stand in their stead. This
was typically a device used by the wealthy. The poor were simply fined for non-participation but
collecting was problematical and half-hearted in execution.
The biggest failure of depending upon the militia was the over-reliance upon civic virtue. Without
proper controls and sanctions, without resourcing and leadership, the average citizen did what his
forebears did. He shirked his civic duties and responsibilities. Human frailty was left out of the
equation when congress drafted the Militia Act of 1792. It is not surprising that many citizens failed
to arm and equip themselves at their own expense, nor fail to appear for training when there were
more pressing concerns.
Nevertheless, the militia musters, proposed at approximately twice per year, were among the largest
gatherings in the community, particularly in isolated and rural communities. More often, the muster
was a once per year affair, usually held after the fall harvest or in conjunction with a holiday,
especially Independence Day. It was a social community gathering as much as a military function.
It provided an opportunity for the men in the area to swap horses, play at politics, discuss land
prices, seek votes, and get caught up on news. It was also accompanied by plentiful alcohol and
celebration as local dignitaries tried to win over the favor of the militiamen.
The annual muster helped to serve as a unifying force in the community. It was a more inclusive
gathering than the more frequent and typical gatherings of fraternal organizations. The Muster was
a cementing force for democracy and an agent for the transformation of society, economically,
socially and politically. However, as a military function, the annual militia muster, if it was held at
all, was a thing of little value. It was too short in duration, too infrequent and too distracted by
other happenings to contribute much to the readiness of the 19th century soldier.
Training and Equipment
Training, if it was accomplished, was done according to the doctrine of Baron Von Steuben from his
1799 Manual of Discipline and Formation. The musters also were an opportunity to inspect the men
and their equipment and to note the readiness of each individual in meeting the requirements of
“a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch, with a box
therein, to contain not less than twenty four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or firelock, each cartridge to
contain a proper quantity of powder and ball; or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch, and powder-horn, twenty
balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder; and shall appear so armed, accoutred and
provided, when called out to exercise or into service, except, that when called out on company days to exercise only,
he may appear without a knapsack.”
The Militia Act of 1792 was twice amended: in 1803 to require Adjutant Generals to file an annual
report to the War Department, and in 1808 to finally provide for an annual distribution of $200,000
in arms to the states apportioned according to the number of soldiers enrolled. This sum was far too
little to be of practical value. In summary, the Militia Act of 1792 was a true expression of the
sentiment of the time and the belief in a militia nation as the Jeffersonian response to national
security threats. As we shall see, in the War of 1812, the readiness of the militia force left much to be
desired. Jim Dan Hill in “The Minute Man in Peace and War” compares the Act to an elaborate
accounting system, not unlike the modern Selective Service System. While useful as a ledger of
possibilities, it proved to be of little practical value as a form of national defense. The lack of training,
equipment and discipline as a result of years of neglect, resulted in a very weak and ineffectual force.
On paper, it gave the nation a formidable manpower pool, but despite its specificity, there was little
accomplished without federal and state penalties, enforcement, and the fiscal resources to support the
desires of the legislators.
The tiny professional regular army that was permitted by the Congress (under 12,000 soldiers) was
understandably vexed with its lot and resentful of the militia. A mutual mistrust began almost from
the very start, which reverberates even today.
It was more efficient and less expensive to train and organize select units of volunteer militia of more
immediate utility, and these were termed the “Organized Militia”. In September 1792 a battalion of
militia was raised and sent to reinforce the United States Army remaining in service until the last day
In 1797 an arsenal was constructed in an open field in Wilmington by order of the United States
government in the block bounded by Washington Street between Eighth and Ninth Streets today.
Major Cass with a detachment of regular army commanded the facility in 1800. The long one-story
brick structure occupied about one acre and was used for storing weapons, cannon and ammunition
by the War Department. During the War of 1812 it was a rendezvous for the volunteer militia
companies of the town as well as Army Regulars.
The militia of that time was composed of combinations of light infantry, light dragoons, (mounted
infantry) light horse and grenadiers (grenade throwers, usually chosen from among the tallest and
strongest men). Light infantry were lightly armed soldiers who could fight on foot or on horseback.
The primary difference between dragoons and light horse was that dragoons were trained to fight on
either foot or horseback, while light horsemen were trained to fight exclusively while mounted.
The principle advantage of mounted forces was mobility and speed. The term “light” usually refers to
the absence of armor. The missions of the light cavalry were primarily reconnaissance, screening,
skirmishing, raiding, and most importantly, communications.
Scharf’s “History of Delaware” lists a number of colorful volunteer militia organizations from that
The Republican Blues, of the Third Delaware Regiment and the Second Troop of the Light Dragoons,
gave a farewell dinner at Cantwell’s Bridge in 1802 and then disbanded. Most of the members had
been Revolutionary War patriots.
Veterans Corps (composed of soldiers of the Revolution, Captain Allen McLane, 1st Lt. Edward
Roche, 2nd Lt George Monro, 3rd Lt. David Kirkpatrick.
Wilmington Troop of Horse, Captain John Warner, 1st Lt. Joseph Stidham, 2nd Lt. James Gardner,
Cornet N. G. Williamson, privates – forty three.
Wilmington Light Infantry, Captain Frederick Leonard, 1st Lt. Samuel Carnahan, 2nd Lt. Alexander
Porter, Privates – fifty two.
First Artillery, Captain C.A. Rodney, 1st Lt. Archibald Hamilton, 2nd Lt. Allan Thomson, rank and
file – fifty eight.
Second Artillery, Captain David C. Wilson, 1st Lt. Benjamin H. Springer, 2nd Lt. John W. Robinson,
privates – fifty.
Militia (two companies) Captain, William Shipley, 1st Lt. G. James Wolfe, Ensign Solomon Beckley,
non-commissioned officers and privates – two hundred fifty. Captain Perry Sheward, 1st Lt.
Benjamin Bracken, Ensign Abraham Tilton, non-commissioned officers and privates two hundred.
In 1807, H. Dearborn of the War Department requested the Governor of Delaware to render an
annual report on the state of the Delaware Militia every December to the President of the United
States and to the Congress. (It had been a requirement since the Militia Act was amended in 1803).
Jesse Green, Adjutant General sent his report to his Commander-In-Chief, the Governor in 1808.
According to his report the strength of the Delaware Militia at the time was 10,665 enlisted men,
including 100 artillerymen, 220 cavalry, 94 grenadiers, 875 light infantry, 61 riflemen, 8579 infantry
and 11 pieces of ordnance. There were 16 men in the general and field staff and 110 men in the field
offices and regimental staff.
By comparison, the contemporary Delaware National Guard in a much more populous 21st century
state has only about 2600 Army and Air National Guardsmen on its rolls.
These annual reports were drafted by the Adjutant General and his staff and were addressed to the
Governor, then presumably forwarded to the War Department. They possess a great deal of detail,
including rosters of the officer leadership of the organizations, their rank and date of commission,
military specialty such as surgeon, paymaster or adjutant, (mostly being infantry or grenadiers), as
well as their unit of assignment. The report also lists the enlisted men and equipment on hand as a
measure of readiness including non-commissioned officers broken down by sergeants and corporals,
drum and fifers, and rank and files (by number assigned but not by name.) It includes numbers of
firelocks fit for service, bayonets, cartouche (cartridge) boxes, and stand of colors. Finally, the report
offers a description of the uniforms of the respective units, which varied from regiment to regiment.
An example from the 1st Brigade Cavalry: Blue Coats faced with Red, red Cuffs & Capes yellow buttons
with yellow cord buff vestcoats & Small Cloath Leather Caps hare skin red feathers blue sash Longboots & spur
The Several Brigades of Delaware Militia, November 27, 1810, commanded by Major General
Thomas Robinson, reported by the Adjutant General Jesse Green.
1st Brigade (New Castle Co.): Commander, Brigadier General John Stockton
1st Regiment, Commander Colonel John Caldwell, 1133 men
2nd regiment Commander Colonel Archd. Alexander576 men
3rd Regiment Commander, Colonel Joshua Carter, 759 men
Captain John Bird’s Artillery, 48 men
Captain John Crow’s Troop of Horse, 41 men
Captain Nathan Covinton’s Troop of Horse, 45 men
2nd Brigade (Kent Co.): Commander, Brigadier General Isaac Davis
A troop of cavalry
Capt. Holland’s Artillery Company
Capt. Davis’s Artillery Company,
4th Regiment, Commander, Colonel Robert Hopkins, 750 men
5th Regiment, Commander, Colonel Henry M. Ridgley, 950 men
6th Regiment Commander, Colonel John Woods, 678 men
3rd Brigade (Sussex Co.): Commander, Brigadier General Thomas Fisher
Captain Thomas Rodney’s Artillery Company, 44 men
Captain William Shanklin’s Troop of Cavalry, 35 men
7th Regiment, Commander, Colonel John Wilson, 629 men
8th Regiment, Commander Colonel Thomas Carlisle, 603 men
9th Regiment, Commander Colonel Michell Kershaw, 768 men
10th Regiments, Commander Armwell Long, 536 men
Included in the list of officers in the several brigades were details of the uniforms worn. An example
from the 1st Brigade Cavalry: Blue Coats faced with Red, red Cuffs & Capes yellow buttons with
yellow cord buff vestcoats & Small Cloath Leather Caps hare skin red feathers blue sash Longboots
& spur Blk Stocks.
In summary, until the War of 1812, the nation relied upon the enrolled militia as its primary means
of defense. Its few (less than 12,000) professional soldiers were out of sight and out of mind scattered
on the frontiers of the young nation. When war came, the under-trained under-equipped and
unready enrolled militia simply was not up to the task. The War of 1812 revealed the weakness of
relying upon this unwieldy concept, despite many exceptional and heroic individual successes. The
system first put into law in 1792 was allowed to decline into disuse. Delaware abolished mandatory
service in the enrolled militia in 1831.
The militia concept lived on however, in the form of the “organized” or volunteer militia. This model
would be the basis for the future modern National Guard.
To learn more about the Delaware National Guard during the War of 1812 click here.
The United States Constitution
Militia Acts of 1792
“History of Delaware: 1609-1888”, John Thomas Scharf, 1888, L.J. Richards & Co., Philadelphia
History of the Militia and the National Guard, John K. Mahon 1983, MacMillan Publ. New York
“I am the Guard”, Michael Doubler 2001, U.S. Army Pamphlet No. 130-1, US GPO
“Delaware Militia” An unpublished manuscript by Raymond Wilson. 1940, Delaware Military
Heritage and Education Foundation Archives
Delaware State Budget, FY 2012
“The Delaware Militia in the War of 1812”, Henry C. Peden attempts to list the name of every
Delawarean recorded who participated in the War drawn from unit rosters, return of fines, courts
martial and other archival documents. It is the most comprehensive available source for researching
Delaware Archives, Military Volume IV
A Brief History of the Militia and the National Guard, Renee Hylton-Greene, Major Robert K.
Wright, 1986, Depts. of the Army and Air Force Historical services branch, National Guard Bureau.